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DISASTER MYTHOLOGY AND AVAILABILITY
CASCADES
LISA GROW SUN†
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, both public officials and
the mainstream media painted a dramatic and deeply disturbing
picture of violence and looting in devastated New Orleans. The New
Orleans Police Superintendent asserted that “little babies [were]
getting raped” in the Superdome, a shelter where hurricane survivors
1
took refuge. As a guest on the Oprah Winfrey Show, New Orleans
Mayor Ray Nagin reported that Katrina’s survivors were sinking into
an “almost animalistic state” after days of “watching hooligans killing
2
people, raping people.”
Similar accounts dominated newspaper headlines and TV
coverage of Katrina for days. The media consistently depicted postKatrina New Orleans both as a city descending into anarchy and
violence and as a war-zone in which Katrina’s victims attacked those
who had come to their aid. Epitomizing this alarming rhetoric, a New
York Times editorial reported that New Orleans was “a snake pit of
anarchy, death, looting, raping, marauding thugs, suffering innocents,
a shattered infrastructure, a gutted police force, insufficient troop

† The author would like to thank the International Institute for the Sociology of Law in
Oñati, Spain, as well as the National Science Foundation (SES #1051408) for their support of
this project. The author would also like to thank the participants in the workshop on disasters
and sociolegal studies that the Institute sponsored in July of 2011. An earlier version of this
article is included in the proceedings of that workshop, available in the online Oñati Socio-Legal
Series through the Social Science Research Network.
1. Oprah Reports, OPRAH.COM (Sept. 6, 2005), http://www.oprah.com/slideshow/
oprahshow/oprahshow1_ss_20050906/2; see Joseph B. Treaster & Abby Goodnough, Powerful
Storm Threatens Havoc Along Gulf Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/29/national/29storm.html?scp=1&sq=Powerful%20Storm%20
Threatens%20Havoc%20Along%20Gulf%20Coast&st=cse (describing how the Superdome
functioned as a designated shelter of last resort, where almost ten thousand people sought
refuge).
2. Brian Thevenot, Myth-Making in New Orleans, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Dec. 2005–
Jan. 2006, at 30, 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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levels and criminally negligent government planning.” Not to be
outdone, the Financial Times of London asserted that, at the
Convention Center, another shelter of last resort for New Orleans’
besieged citizens, “girls and boys were raped in the dark and had their
throats cut and bodies were stuffed in the kitchens while looters and
4
madmen exchanged fire with weapons they had looted.” The lead
news story in the Los Angeles Times described National Guard troops
taking “positions on rooftops, scanning for snipers and armed mobs
5
as seething crowds of refugees milled below, desperate to flee.”
Television coverage likewise asserted that looting had overtaken New
Orleans. Television channels played clips of Katrina survivors taking
goods from deserted stores in a seemingly never-ending 24-hour loop.
Yet these unrelenting tales of anarchy, violence, and chaos in
post-Katrina New Orleans proved to be, at best, greatly exaggerated
and, at worst, utterly false. Nearly a month after Katrina struck New
Orleans, major news outlets retracted many of their previous reports
6
of widespread violence and crime in Katrina’s wake. Unfortunately,
the early reports have proved resilient, and the truth has never fully
overtaken the myth.
II. DISASTER MYTHOLOGY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The myths about post-disaster human behavior that took hold in
the aftermath of Katrina were not unique to that catastrophe. More
than three decades earlier, disaster sociologists had identified several
important public misconceptions about typical human behavior in the
7
aftermath of disasters. These misconceptions—also called “disaster
myths”—include (1) the myth that widespread antisocial behavior,
such as violence and looting, is common after disasters; (2) the myth
3. Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., United States of Shame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2005, at A21,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/03/opinion/03dowd.html?scp=1&sq=Maureen%
20Dowd%20United%20States%20of%20Shame&st=cse.
4. Guy Dinmore, City of Rape, Rumour and Recrimination, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at 7.
5. Ellen Barry, Scott Gold & Stephen Braun, New Orleans Slides into Chaos; U.S.
Scrambles to Send Troops, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
2005/sep/02/nation/na-katrina2.
6. Compare id., with Jim Dwyer & Christopher Drew, Fear Exceeded Crime’s Reality in
New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/29/
national/nationalspecial/29crime.html?scp=1&sq=Fear%20Exceeded%20Crime%27s%20Realit
y&st=cse, and Susannah Rosenblatt & James Rainey, Katrina Takes a Toll on Truth, News
Accuracy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at A16, and Brian Thevenot & Gordon Russell, Rape.
Murder. Gunfights., NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 26, 2005, at A1.
7. E.L. Quarantelli & Russell R. Dynes, When Disaster Strikes (It Isn’t Much Like What
You’ve Heard & Read About), 5 PSYCHOL. TODAY 67, 67–69 (1972).
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that most disaster survivors will panic and engage in irrational flight
behavior; and (3) the myth that disaster survivors commonly suffer a
shock reaction that paralyzes them and interferes with their ability to
8
respond to the disaster and care for themselves and others.
Understanding how these myths gain traction during disasters is
important because these misconceptions distort our legal and policy
framework for disaster response and recovery. The myth of
widespread antisocial activity, for example, has resulted in a U.S.
legal system of disaster response that overemphasizes security risks at
9
the expense of humanitarian efforts to rescue and care for survivors.
First, exaggerated reports of looting and violence post-disaster make
the President more likely to deploy federal troops in a law
enforcement capacity, rather than a humanitarian capacity, and less
likely to deploy troops at all if the President decides for legal or
political reasons not to invest federal troops with law enforcement
10
authority. Second, such exaggerated reports also tend to delay aid to
survivors. After Katrina, Mayor Nagin reacted to exaggerated reports
of violence and looting by diverting 1,500 New Orleans police officers
11
from search and rescue missions to anti-looting patrol. Officials also
delayed delivery of desperately needed food, water, and sanitation
supplies to shelters of last resort until massive military escorts could
be assembled to accompany the deliveries and respond to the looting
12
and gangs that officials expected the shipments to encounter. Third,
public officials may respond to inflated fears of looting and violence
by implementing restrictions on freedom and freedom of
movement—such as roadblocks, curfews, and vague declarations of
8. Id.
9. See Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1131, 1136
(2011) (outlining deleterious effects of disaster myths on survivors).
10. Id. at 1152. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, President Bush’s advisors
apparently advised him that invoking the Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006), to
federalize state National Guard units and invest those units and federal regular troops with law
enforcement authority would be problematic because of the potential political ramifications of
seizing control from Louisiana’s female, Democratic governor. See Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt &
Thom Shanker, Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1.
Concern about sending federal troops without law enforcement authority into the chaotic
environment described in the exaggerated reports then delayed commitment of federal troops
to New Orleans to meet vital humanitarian needs. See Sun, supra note 9, at 1161–62.
11. Id. at 1174–75 (citing New Orleans Mayor Orders Looting Crackdown, MSNBC.COM
(Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9063708/ (recounting how New Orleans Mayor
Nagin “ordered 1,500 police officers to leave their search-and-rescue mission Wednesday
night . . . to stop looting that has turned increasingly hostile”).
12. Id. at 1176; Katy Reckdahl, The Myths of New Orleans, TUCSON WEEKLY, Aug. 24,
2006, http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/the-myths-of-new-orleans/Content?oid=1085005.
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“martial law”—that may risk excessive use of force by police,
interfere with response efforts, delay evacuated residents’ return to
13
their homes, and violate basic rights. Private citizens may likewise
react to the myth by engaging in vigilante behavior to protect
themselves and their property from perceived, but largely imaginary,
14
threats. Fourth, the prevalence of the disaster myth of looting and
violence convinces us to squander post-disaster political capital on
enacting unnecessary looting laws, often at the expense of adopting
hazard mitigation measures that might protect lives and property
15
during the next hazard event.
In addition to these concrete, detrimental effects on our legal
and policy framework for disaster response, exaggerated reports of
16
widespread looting and violence can also stigmatize disaster victims.
That stigma can make other communities less receptive to taking in
disaster survivors, in both the short and long term. In the short term,
communities may balk at setting up evacuation centers and shelters
for displaced survivors. In the long term, those survivors who choose
to permanently relocate to another community may face
17
discrimination in employment and other opportunities.
Katrina survivors from New Orleans faced this kind of stigma in
cities where they took refuge. For example, many New Orleans
residents relocated, at least temporarily, to Houston. During that
time, it was widely reported in both the local and national news that
Katrina survivors were responsible for a wave of crime in the
18
Houston area. Studies later disproved the existence of a “Katrina
13. Sun, supra note 9, at 1178.
14. Id. at 1148.
15. Id. at 1198.
16. See Gail Garfield, Hurricane Katrina: The Making of Unworthy Disaster Victims, 10 J.
AFR. AM. ST. 55, 58 (2007) (describing the effects of “rampant black criminality . . . reported in
news accounts” on the government’s emergency response).
17. See CTR. FOR SOC. WORK RESEARCH, KATRINA EVACUEES IN AUSTIN, TEXAS:
ANALYSIS OF NEEDS ASSESSMENT DATA 8 (2006), available at http://www.utexas.edu/research/
cswr/katrina/Documents/City%20of%20Aus%20Final%20Report.pdf (reporting “evidence of
discrimination or negative stereotypes that undermined the successful employment of evacuees
who remained in Texas, particularly in the Houston area where hostility ran particularly high”).
18. See, e.g., Miguel Bustillo, Houston Grumbles as Evacuees Stay Put, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
21, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/aug/21/nation/na-evac21. Although Katrina evacuees
were stereotyped, in part, because of the high crime rates that plagued New Orleans prior to the
storm, see, e.g., Nicole Gelinas, Katrina Refugees Shoot Up Houston, CITY J., http://www.cityjournal.org/html/eon2006-01-04ng.html (“[I]t’s also irrefutable that when New Orleans was
inundated with floodwaters, what flooded out of the Crescent City was a core criminal
underclass that, before the storm, generated the highest urban murder rate in the nation.”), the
reports of widespread looting and violence in Katrina’s aftermath contributed to the public
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crime wave,” ushered in by evacuees from New Orleans, but the
19
stigma remains. The stigmatization of Katrina survivors as violent
criminals has also resulted in employment and housing discrimination
20
against survivors.
III. DISASTER MYTH PERPETUATION AS AN AVAILABILITY
CASCADE
These detrimental consequences of the disaster myth of
widespread violence and looting demonstrate the necessity of finding
political and legal tools to counter the myth’s perpetuation and its
21
effects on our framework for disaster response and recovery.
Considering the perpetuation of disaster mythology as an “availability
22
cascade” may be helpful in understanding the myth’s spread and in
generating possible options for countering the myth and its
consequences.
Cass Sunstein and Timur Kuran have defined an “availability
cascade” as “a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation
by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that gives
the perception increasing plausibility through its rising availability in
23
public discourse.” More simply, an availability cascade results from
the “interaction of the ‘availability heuristic’—a mental shortcut by
which an individual judges the probability of an event by his or her
ability to conjure up examples of that event—and the social
24
mechanisms through which risk perceptions are propagated.”

perception that Katrina evacuees were criminals, see, e.g., Dan Vergano, No Crime Wave
Among Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, U.S.A. TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/weather/
storms/hurricanes/2010-02-12-hurricane-katrina-crime_N.htm (quoting disaster scholar Joseph
Trainor for the proposition that “[a] crime wave spawned by evacuees is typical of ‘disaster
myths’ seen after catastrophes”).
19. See James Pinkerton, Study: Katrina Crime Wave Nonexistent in Houston, HOUS.
CHRON., Feb. 15, 2010, http://www.chron.com/disp.story.mpl/metropolitan/ 6868718.html#
ixzz1NV6taCRz (“A huge crime wave blamed on thousands of Katrina evacuees in Houston
and other Southwest cities never happened, say criminologists who warned public officials and
the media to be careful in attributing crime to the former New Orleans residents.”).
20. Reckdahl, supra note 12.
21. See Sun, supra note 9, at 1136 (outlining legal and political measures that could help
counter the harmful effects of the disaster myth).
22. Id. at 1150.
23. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 683, 683 (1999); Kuran and Sunstein consider examples such as Love Canal, Alar in
apples, airplane safety, asbestos, and Agent Orange in their analysis of availability cascades. See
id. at 691–703.
24. Sun, supra note 9, at 1150 (quoting Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 685).
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The mental “availability” of violence and looting as disaster risks
is amplified in the United States by a popular culture of disaster
movies and by media reporting of disasters, both of which—not
surprisingly—focus on such antisocial behavior in disasters’
aftermath:
The calm, helping behaviors typically exhibited by disaster
survivors are hardly the fodder of either attention grabbing
headlines or fast-paced entertainment. Those portrayals of disaster
increase the mental ‘availability’ of violence and looting as disaster
risks by proliferating examples of disaster-related violence and
25
looting (even if those examples never, in fact, occurred).

A disaster risk that has a human component—like looting and
violence—may also be more “available” mentally than the underlying
risks posed by the natural hazard event itself because manmade risks
tend to be more salient in people’s minds than those that appear to be
26
naturally created. While some academics (like Sunstein and Kuran)
are likely to view this tendency to focus on and react more strongly to
manmade risks than “natural risks” as a cognitive error, others (like
Dan Kahan of Yale’s Cultural Cognition Project) might view this
27
tendency as a culturally mediated value judgment. Regardless of

25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 709; Lennart Sjoberg, Risk Perception:
Experts and the Public, 3 EUR. PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 1, 3, Mar. 1999 (“[P]eople seem to react much
stronger to man-made risks and disasters caused by human error or negligent behavior than to
disasters of a similar magnitude.” (citation omitted)).
It is a truism among disaster scholars that there is no such thing as a “natural” disaster, because
such disasters are caused by the interaction of human social systems with hazard events. Gilbert
White, the influential geographer who shaped much early disaster scholarship, wrote more than
seventy years ago that “[f]loods are ‘acts of god,’ but flood losses are largely acts of man.” John
Schwartz, Obituary, Gilbert F. White, 94, Expert on Floods and Nature, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/07/obituaries/07white.html. The same is true for other
types of “natural” disasters, as well. Nonetheless, the average citizen may be less aware of this
human contribution to so-called natural disasters, and thus seems likely to view the associated
risk as primarily natural (rather than manmade) in origin.
27. Sun, supra note 9, at 1151 (citing Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk
Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 741 (2008) (asserting that “emotional apprehensions of risk
reflect persons’ expressive appraisals of putatively dangerous activates”)). Kahan does not
challenge the existence of availability cascades, but contends that shared “cultural
commitments” help determine which risk perceptions are likely to take hold in certain groups
and that risk perceptions are likely to “feed upon one another among persons who share
cultural commitments.” See Kahan, supra, at 757 (“[I]nsofar as one of the primary sources of
information people have about the relationship between their values and a putatively dangerous
activity is what persons who share their commitments think about it, perceptions of danger
naturally feed upon one another among persons who share cultural commitments.”). Thus,
Kahan suggests that informational cascades are likely to be bounded by—rather than bridge—
existing divides between groups with different cultural commitments. On this view,
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how one characterizes this tendency, the consequence is that at least
some members of the public may be predisposed to believe that
violence and looting are common reactions to disasters because of the
salience of those manmade risks.
Sunstein and Kuran’s work on availability cascades focuses on
the role of two (often interrelated) social mechanisms that produce
and amplify availability cascades: “informational cascades” and
28
“reputational cascades.” An informational cascade—or “bandwagon
or snowballing process”—arises when individuals “base their own
beliefs on the apparent beliefs of others” because those individuals
29
lack complete information about the relevant issues. Informational
cascades occur, in part, because of the “bounded rationality” of
human beings: individuals necessarily lack the time, resources, and
mental energy to gain perfect information on every matter; therefore,
individuals may be inclined to accept a particular view “simply
30
[because] of its acceptance by others.” Informational cascades may
be particularly likely to occur in the aftermath of disasters, which
often curtail access to information by disrupting communication
networks and which also bring basic survival needs to the forefront,
perhaps crowding out some attempts to verify the accuracy of
information received from fellow survivors and other sources.
Hurricane survivors, for example, “may be inclined to believe that
looting is likely to occur simply because their neighbors post signs
declaring that ‘Looters will be shot,’ reflecting the neighbors’
31
apparent belief that looting is a serious problem.” They may also be
inclined to believe word-of-mouth reports from fellow survivors that
looting and violence are occurring because they lack adequate means
and time to verify the stories and believing a false report is likely to
appear less personally costly than disbelieving a report that turns out
32
to be true.

informational cascades usually occur in groups with shared cultural commitments, rather than
spanning groups with divergent preexisting commitments. Id.
28. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 685.
29. Id. at 685–86.
30. Id.
31. Sun, supra note 9, at 1151.
32. Because individuals often will not be aware of the true cost to them (and will not
internalize the societal costs) of “false positives”—reports that reflect exaggerated or untrue
claims of looting and violence, they are likely to focus on the risk to them and their families of
“false negatives”—failure to raise the alarm and take proper protection against looting and
violence that is actually occurring. Accordingly, individuals may be more inclined to believe
exaggerated or false claims of looting and violence than to discount those claims, and the
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The second social mechanism for spreading availability errors is
a reputational cascade. A reputational cascade occurs when an
individual embraces a certain view in her public dealings (a view
which may conflict with the person’s own privately held view) to
33
garner public approval or forestall public criticism or censure. For
example, a state governor might call out the state National Guard to
police a disaster-devastated area, not because she believes that
looting and violence are likely to occur, but because she believes her
constituents are concerned about those risks and will criticize her for
34
failing to take action to counter those risks. Similarly, a state
legislator might propose passing or strengthening a state looting law
after a serious disaster in his state, not because he believes the law is
necessary to deal with disaster looting, but because he believes he can
score political points with his constituents who worry about looting of
their homes.
Observations gleaned from the perpetuation of disaster
mythology suggest that perhaps reputational cascades should be
viewed as a subset of a broader category we might term “false
acquiescence cascades.” Individuals may have various motivations,
aside from reputational interests, for “false acquiescence”—acting
and speaking as though they hold a particular view, when in fact they
35
36
do not, including motivations that are more public-regarding. For
example, during Hurricane Gilbert, one city emergency manager,
who knew that “looting rarely occurs,” “took very public precautions
to prevent looting” in order “to convince citizens that it was safe to
37
evacuate.” This example suggests that once a risk assessment has
achieved a certain threshold of acceptance, individuals may acquiesce
in, and even participate in, the perpetuation of that assessment, even
if they disagree with it, for fear that the assessment is too widely held

“informational cascade” will be perpetuated.
33. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 686–87.
34. Sun, supra note 9, at 1151.
35. Kuran refers to this phenomenon as “preference falsification,” TIMUR KURAN,
PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE
FALSIFICATION ix (Harvard Univ. Press, 1997), so these “false acquiescence cascades” might
also be termed “preference falsification cascades.” However, Kuran defines “preference
falsification” primarily as misrepresentation of private preferences induced by “social
pressures” such as reputational interests. Id. “False acquiescence” is intended to capture a
broader range of motivations.
36. See KURAN, supra note 35, at 3.
37. HENRY W. FISCHER, III, RESPONSE TO DISASTER: FACT VERSUS FICTION AND ITS
PERPETUATION; THE SOCIOLOGY OF DISASTER 51 (Univ. Press of Am., 3d ed. 2008).
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to be effectively countered and that failure to respond to that
assessment will produce adverse social consequences. We might call
this subset of false acquiescence cascades “futility cascades.”
Futility cascades might occur in many different contexts beyond
the propagation of disaster myths. For example, a public official who
is convinced of the validity of anthropogenic climate change, but
whose constituency is dominated by climate change skeptics, might
decide to frame government measures she believes would help
mitigate climate change as promoting efficiency or reducing some
other pollutant, rather than as mitigating green house gases. She
might adopt this stance because she believes that public opinion on
climate change is currently intransigent in her area and that framing
the necessary measures as climate change mitigation will be
counterproductive and will inhibit their adoption. Thus, she might
publicly appear to acquiesce in climate change skepticism by
implicitly or explicitly endorsing the view that the measures should
only be undertaken to serve other, less controversial, goals in order to
secure their implementation. Scholars have thus far given insufficient
attention to the possibility that public officials (or other individuals)
might acquiesce in—and even promote—a particular conception of
risk for reasons that are less about bounded rationality or
reputational interests and more grounded in that individual’s desire
to further the public good in the face of substantial and intractable
opposition to what the individual views as the “correct” assessment of
risk.
IV. POTENTIAL TOOLS FOR COUNTERING DISASTER MYTH
PERPETUATION
Framing the perpetuation of disaster mythology as an availability
cascade may be helpful in addressing the problems created by disaster
myths because scholars have already identified some tools to reduce
the deleterious effects availability cascades can have on risk
regulation. These tools include altering the incentives of so-called
“availability entrepreneurs” and insulating decision-makers from
political pressures generated by availability cascades.
The first of these ideas suggests that availability cascades might
be addressed by changing the incentives of those who are principally
responsible for both setting the cascade in motion and perpetuating
its spread. Sunstein and Kuran posit the existence of “availability
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entrepreneurs,” who “instigat[e] and manipulat[e] . . . availability
38
campaigns,” often to achieve some political end. In the disaster myth
context, at least some of those most directly involved in myth
perpetuation—Hollywood producers and media—seem driven less by
political aims and more by commercial concerns. These myth
perpetuators seem to be unwitting “entrepreneurs” at best, at least in
terms of the political and social effects of disaster mythology.
Even the incentives of some of these accidental entrepreneurs
potentially could be altered, however, by imposing penalties for the
perpetuation of availability cascades based on false premises. For
example, Kuran and Sunstein discuss the possibility of product
defamation laws as one way to deter availability cascades that
39
exaggerate the dangers posed by particular products. The parallel
remedy for disaster myths might be group libel suits, brought by
disaster survivors. In the case of post-Katrina New Orleans, there is
evidence that the false media reporting permanently stigmatized New
Orleanians as a group, as dangerous and violent people, who are
40
undeserving of our assistance. As suggested earlier, that stigma has
followed many displaced Katrina survivors to their new homes
(whether temporary or permanent) in other cities, making it more
41
difficult for them to find both housing and jobs. The stigmatization
of New Orleans Katrina survivors may also have influenced the
amount of money the country has been willing to commit to
42
rebuilding New Orleans.
However, because group libel suits have been all but eliminated
by the United States Supreme Court on First Amendment grounds,
they are neither a remedy for these potential harms in the U.S., nor
43
an effective deterrent of similar myth-perpetuation in the future.
Nevertheless, given that the media have no obvious political

38. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 733; see also id. at 713 (“Availability cascades
do not appear randomly. For one thing, activists choose which dangers to stress publicly. For
another, if an availability cascade is to unfold, enough people must initially be receptive to it.”).
39. Id. at 749–51.
40. Garfield, supra note 16, at 58.
41. See Reckdahl, supra note 12 (recounting anecdotes of discrimination suffered by
displaced New Orleans residents in Houston).
42. Id.
43. Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute making it
unlawful to engage in group libel against a “class of citizens,” Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 251–57 (1952), this holding has been severely undermined by the Court’s subjection of
defamation law to First Amendment inquiry under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
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motivation for perpetuating disaster mythology and have at least an
aspirational commitment to truth, a targeted information campaign
that exposes disaster mythology and suggests other attentiongrabbing headlines (like dramatic rescues) might succeed in
44
decreasing media reporting of disaster myths.
Disaster sociologists Kathleen Tierney and Christine Bevc have
perhaps identified a more purposeful availability entrepreneur of
looting and violence mythology by positing that those who favor
militarism in society will tend to perpetuate mythology that sets the
45
stage for militarized disaster response. Other potential myth
perpetuators include law-enforcement agencies in the affected areas,
who might fear losing control and might hope that rumors of looting
and violence will result either in outside reinforcements or loosening
of constitutional or other restraints on law enforcement activities (as
46
under the popular conception of “martial law”). Local public
officials (as well as business owners and disaster survivors in affected
areas), desperate for a quick influx of outside aid, might also
exaggerate law-and-order difficulties on the ground in an effort to
47
spur faster state and federal response. The same officials might
exaggerate law-and-order difficulties for an entirely different reason:
48
to justify and excuse slow or inept governmental response.
Conversely, political opponents of current officeholders might
attempt to get a jump-start on the “blame game” that often follows
49
natural disasters by exaggerating the prevalence of looting and
violence in the disaster’s aftermath. More fundamentally,
emphasizing that disaster-induced governmental breakdown or
incapacity results in a kind of Hobbesian state of nature among
survivors may justify more mundane, everyday governmental
exercises of power outside the disaster context, as well, by reaffirming
that only government stands between us and chaos.
Some of these incentives to perpetuate the disaster myth could

44. Cf. FISCHER, supra note 37, at 93 (reporting that education in disaster myths improved
the accuracy of two newspaper reporters’ coverage of a local disaster).
45. See Kathleen Tierney & Christine Bevc, Disaster as War: Militarism and the Social
Construction of Disaster in New Orleans, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF KATRINA: PERSPECTIVES ON A
MODERN CATASTROPHE 35, 39 (David L. Brunsma et al. eds., 2007).
46. See id. at 1182.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., J. Steven Picou & Brent K. Marshall, Introduction: Katrina as Paradigm Shift:
Reflections on Disaster Research in the Twenty-First Century, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF KATRINA
supra note 45, at 1, 13.
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potentially be countered by amending disaster laws and plans to
preclude the outcomes the “availability entrepreneurs” seek. For
50
example, the Insurrection Act, which allows the President to invest
federal military troops (or federalized National Guard troops) with
51
law enforcement powers during, inter alia, “insurrections,” could be
interpreted narrowly to preclude the President from deploying
federal military as disaster police absent clear evidence of widespread
rebellion against government authority. Making clear that there is a
substantial threshold that must be met before investing military with
law enforcement authority during natural disasters might convince
would-be availability entrepreneurs who favor militarization of
disaster response that exaggerating law-and-order difficulties to force
52
the militarization of the federal response would likely be futile.
Similarly, if the relevant state and local disaster laws preclude the
imposition of martial law during a disaster (or the suspension of
federal constitutional rights), local police may be less likely to
exaggerate rates of looting and violence because they know that such
53
rumors cannot be invoked to justify restrictions on basic rights.
Making clear to local officials that, historically, attempts to speed aid
by overplaying law-enforcement concerns have often backfired,
slowing the delivery of aid and interfering with recovery efforts,
might also mitigate public officials’ incentives to perpetuate inflated
54
These mechanisms for
rumors of violence and looting.
disincentivizing myth perpetuation may be important tools for
countering disaster mythology.
The second of Kuran and Sunstein’s ideas suggests reliance on
politically insulated, deliberative expert decision-makers as a solution
to the arguably irrational risk regulation spurred by availability
55
cascades. In particular, they recommend that these politically
insulated decision-makers employ cost-benefit analysis. Dan Kahan

50. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006).
51. Id.
52. See Sun, supra note 9, at 1170. There is always the possibility, of course, that insisting
on a high threshold of looting and violence before the Insurrection Act can be invoked (or other
protective measures authorized) might actually lead local officials to exaggerate claims of
looting and violence to demonstrate that the triggering threshold has been met. Social scientists
should continue, where possible and appropriate, to undertake careful empirical study of the
effects of different triggering thresholds on the exaggeration of looting and violence during
disasters, and the law should respond to their findings accordingly.
53. Id. at 1182.
54. Id. at 1178.
55. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 752–58.
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criticizes this proposal, arguing that emotional assessments of risk
reflect cultural value judgments that may be entitled to some weight
in policy-making, which therefore should be democratically
56
accountable rather than insulated from politics.
What kinds of cultural value judgments might contribute to a
heightened willingness to believe that post-disaster looting and
violence are serious disaster risks that should be prioritized over
other risks that exist in a disaster’s aftermath? Perhaps some
individuals believe it is worse to have property stolen by looters than
to have it destroyed by the hazard itself. Similarly, some individuals
might believe it is worse to be injured or killed in post-disaster
violence than by either the hazard event or the humanitarian crisis
the disaster may trigger. While it is possible that such cultural
commitments exist, they may do substantial harm to others who do
57
not share these commitments (by, for example, delaying aid).
Moreover, it seems equally likely—if not more likely—that the myth
of post-disaster violence has found a warm reception with at least
58
some audiences because of racism and classism or because of a
59
propensity to blame victims in order to justify the status quo —
cultural commitments that clearly should not be given weight in
policy-making.
Although Kahan’s concerns do not seem particularly weighty in
this context, assigning disaster decision-making to politically insulated
experts would nonetheless be problematic. The decisions made in a
disaster’s immediate aftermath about issues such as response
priorities and curfews seem like particularly poor candidates for
insulated, deliberative expert decision-making. First, in contrast to
most risk regulation that Congress undertakes, lives at stake in
disaster decision-making are not vague, unidentifiable victims
reduced to statistics, but concrete, more easily identifiable individuals
whose lives and wellbeing are immediately affected. Local citizens,
rightly, will demand that their elected officials make such critical

56. See Kahan, supra note 27, at 760–61.
57. Kahan himself acknowledges that not all such value judgments are entitled to weight in
the democratic process, particularly if imposing those judgments on others “exposes [them] . . .
to significant physical harm or restrictions on liberty.” Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Cultural
Evaluators of Risk: “Values” or “Blunders”?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 171 (2006). In any event, I
reject politically insulated decision-makers for some of the same reasons Kahan does.
58. Sun, supra note 9, at 1149.
59. Jaime L. Napier, Anesu N. Mandisodza, Susan M. Andersen & John T. Jost, System
Justification in Responding to the Poor and Displaced in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 6
ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 57, 64 (2006).
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decisions. Second, all the planning in the world cannot anticipate the
precise problems, demands on resources, and trade-offs that will have
to be considered in a particular disaster situation. Much of the critical
information will not be available until the disaster occurs—and even
then serious information gaps will likely exist. Moreover, decisions
will have to be made under tremendous time pressure in order to
60
minimize deaths, injuries, and property damage.
These
circumstances will generally require quick executive action rather
than deliberative decision-making by some politically insulated body.
Third, most disaster decision-making occurs at state and local levels.
Given this multiplicity of decision-makers, it is difficult to imagine
that each state or locality would have the political will or the
resources to employ insulated experts for disaster decision-making.
This is particularly true given the uncertainty about which localities
will actually suffer major disasters and be forced to call upon those
decision-makers.
Nonetheless, there is significant value in ensuring that disaster
decision-makers have access to advice and counsel from emergencymanagers who are educated in the pitfalls of disaster mythology.
Thus, a first step toward countering disaster mythology may be legally
61
62
requiring or otherwise incentivizing states and local governments to

60. Of course, disaster priorities and plans can and should be put in place before disasters
occur. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1380 (2011) (arguing
that disaster decisions often should be made in advance, rather than procrastinated until the
time of a disaster, because “while information typically becomes more plentiful over time, other
inputs to legal decisions, particularly decisional resources, often become scarcer”). In practice,
however, disaster planning sometimes tends to veer toward the production of what disaster
sociologist Lee Clarke terms “fantasy documents,” which serve primarily to reassure an
organization’s constituencies rather than provide effective blueprints for disaster response. See
generally LEE CLARKE, MISSION IMPROBABLE: USING FANTASY DOCUMENTS TO TAME
DISASTER (U. Chi. Press, 2001). As a descriptive, if not normative matter, some gaps in
planning are to be expected. Moreover, some types of disaster decisions—like planning how
buses will be used to evacuate populations who lack personal transportation, see Super, supra, at
1448—are more amenable to advance decision-making than others because some decisions do
not depend on precise information about where a disaster strikes and what kind of damage it
inflicts.
61. See GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-27(a)(3)(F)-(G) (2007) (requiring, in most circumstances,
that directors and deputy directors of local emergency management organizations hired after
July 1, 1999, be certified under the Georgia Emergency Management Agency’s Certified
Emergency Manager Program and comply with continuing education requirements); see also
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-1a (West 2007) (requiring that the commissioner of the
Connecticut Department of Emergency Management and Homeland Security “possess
professional training and knowledge consisting of not less than five years of managerial or
strategic planning experience in matters relating to public safety, security, emergency services
and emergency response”).
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hire emergency managers who have sufficient education or
experience in managing disasters. Insisting that state and local
emergency-managers fulfill continuing education requirements would
also be valuable, particularly if the curriculum specifically requires
education about disaster mythology. Similarly, the relatively new
requirements for the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) administrator, imposed by the Post Katrina Emergency
63
Management Reform Act of 2006, are an important step toward
64
ensuring that federal decision-makers have more expert input.
Some empirical evidence supports the conclusion that education
of local emergency managers would be beneficial in counteracting
disaster mythology. Although local emergency-managers are more
65
aware of disaster myths than the general public, research suggests
that many still believe important components of disaster mythology.
In a recent survey of local emergency-managers, an overwhelming
majority (85%) “understood that survivors usually are the first to
66
engage in search and rescue activities,” but only half (50%) realized
67
that victims generally do not panic during a disaster. “Less than half

62. See ALA. CODE § 31-9-61 to -62 (LexisNexis 2006) (encouraging local emergency
managers to meet state certification—which requires at least two years of college education,
three years of relevant work experience, and 200 hours of state emergency management
coursework—by providing salary supplements to certified emergency management directors or,
if their salaries already meet a certain threshold, providing the employing entity “an additional
allocation of federal funds” for local planning and mitigation programs).
63. Pub. L. No. 109-295, §§ 689b(b)-689c, 120 Stat. 1394, 1449 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 774–
75 (2006)).
64. See 6 U.S.C. § 313 (2006) (requiring that the FEMA administrator have “a
demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and homeland security” and
“not less than 5 years of executive leadership and management experience in the public or
private sector”). These requirements were imposed largely in reaction to President Bush’s
appointment of Michael Brown, who lacked any significant emergency management experience,
as FEMA Director, which was widely viewed as political cronyism that cost Katrina victims
dearly. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, All the President’s Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/opinion/12krugman.html. In contrast, the
current FEMA Administrator, Craig Fugate, is widely regarded as a capable and experienced
emergency manager. See Ginger Thompson, Emergency Manager Chosen for FEMA, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9401EEDD113DF
936A35750C0A96F9C8B63.
The Post-Katrina Act “also aims to increase the professionalism and expertise of FEMA staff by
requiring FEMA to develop a ‘strategic human capital plan,’ and establish ‘appropriate career
paths’—including requisite training, education, and experience—for agency personnel.”
DANIEL A. FARBER, JIM CHEN, ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK & LISA GROW SUN, DISASTER LAW
AND POLICY 135 (2d ed. 2010) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 10102, 10103 (2006)).
65. See FISCHER, supra note 37, at 124–25.
66. Id. at 125.
67. Id. at 126.
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(46%)” of those surveyed “knew that survivors usually do not behave
68
irrationally due to the shock of the experience.” Thirty-nine percent
69
believed that residents will engage in looting.
Those local emergency managers who had taken more training
courses, experienced at least two disasters, worked as emergency
managers for more than five years, or had additional education had
70
more accurate views of post-disaster human behavior. Neither
general work experience in the disaster field nor participation in
71
disaster drills was positively correlated with more accurate views.
“Education had a greater impact than disaster experience, or any of
the job experience variables (training seminars, drills, years on the
72
job, and years in the field).” The survey results suggest that “hiring
individuals with a college degree and then involving them in an on73
going [emergency-management] training program is optimal.”
Requiring that emergency-managers be college-educated may pay
dividends in other respects, as well. Evidence suggests that the only
factor positively correlated with an emergency manager’s adoption of
mitigation measures (to prevent future disaster costs) is increased
74
education.
Of course, having more highly educated, better-informed
decision-makers is not a full solution to the problems created by
disaster mythology. Indeed, as discussed earlier, even the besteducated decision-makers may feel they have little choice but to
indulge the general public’s fear of violence and looting by taking
very public steps to reassure people in harm’s way that they can safely
evacuate their homes because the National Guard or police stand
ready to thwart potential looters. Decision-makers may reasonably
fear that, without such reassurances, many will fail to evacuate.
For example, Thomas Drabek, a groundbreaking disaster
sociologist, has suggested that the best approach to dealing with the
disaster myth of extensive post-disaster looting is to allay public fears
by creating an “impression” that law enforcement is prepared to

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 127–28.
71. Id. at 128.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 129. Of course, local budget constraints may make hiring more educated
emergency managers difficult, especially given that in some smaller cities and rural areas,
emergency managers may be part-time or may have multiple, unrelated job functions.
74. See id. at 149–52.
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75

prevent looting by heavy policing of the disaster area. Drabek
suggests that local officials should “emphasize security” when dealing
with the public and should “communicate loudly and clearly that
76
security will be tight.” In addition, Drabek suggests that local law
77
enforcement should “buttress” its forces with a “citizens’ patrol.”
Unfortunately, however, these solutions are prime examples of
false acquiescence futility cascades that perpetuate both the myth
itself and the deleterious consequences the myth engenders. While
78
Drabek warns against “overallocat[ing] resources” to looting patrols,
official announcements that such patrols are necessary are likely to
prompt additional media reporting of the myth and to bolster the
public’s belief that looting and violence are typically serious problems
79
in a disaster’s aftermath. Those heightened public fears, in turn, may
increase public demand for excessive security measures that divert
resources from other, more pressing needs. Law enforcement may
also rely on those public fears to justify unnecessary restrictions on
freedom and freedom of movement post-disaster. Moreover,
Drabek’s suggestion that a citizens’ patrol be assembled to police for
looting may well risk the kind of vigilante violence that was observed
after Katrina. Indulging and reinforcing public fears of looting seems
unlikely to be the right answer.
The need for effective public education to counter the disaster
myth of pervasive looting and violence is evident. Unfortunately, the
challenges facing successful education campaigns are both real and
difficult to surmount. Sunstein, for example, is sufficiently skeptical of
the value of public education in countering overblown risk
assessments that he asserts that the best solution is often to “[c]hange
80
the subject.” Despite Sunstein’s well-founded skepticism, carefully
designed disaster public-information campaigns, like environmental
81
education and youth anti-smoking campaigns, may nonetheless be

75. THOMAS E. DRABEK, THE HUMAN SIDE OF DISASTER 97 (CRC Press, 2d ed. 2010).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Cf. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 539 (2004)
(acknowledging that aggressive government action taken to ward off excessive public fears of
terrorism “affirms the legitimacy of the fear”).
80. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
125 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005) (suggesting that the best approach to managing public
overreaction to “low probability risks” is often “[c]hang[ing] the subject”).
81. See, e.g., Matthew C. Farrelly et al., Evidence of a Dose-Response Relationship Between
“Truth” Antismoking Ads and Youth Smoking Prevalence, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 425, 425,

Sun (Do Not Delete)

90

1/7/2013 7:52 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 23:73

among the most effective tools for countering disaster mythology.
Public information campaigns could, for example, publicize the real
tradeoffs that occur when the myth encourages public officials to
prioritize law enforcement needs over search-and-rescue and other
basic humanitarian relief. A greater public understanding of the costs
of disaster myth perpetuation—including the real risks that aid will be
delayed to those in need—might help halt the spread of information
cascades during disasters as individuals will have a better sense that
crediting and spreading “false positive” reports of violence and
looting has real costs—costs that might affect them individually or
82
their family, friends, and neighbors. Dampening information
cascades would, in turn, likely diminish the strength of false
acquiescence cascades, including both the reputational cascades
identified by Kuran and Sunstein and the futility cascades identified
in this article.
Moreover, emotional risk assessments that reflect value
judgments of the type identified by Kahan are most likely to be
reshaped by public information campaigns that focus on altering the
social meaning of disasters and reframing the values at stake. While
the exact content of such campaigns would probably vary from
83
community to community, if public information campaigns can help
reconceptualize natural disasters as events that generally bring out
the best in both people and communities, those campaigns might
increase public skepticism about rumors of disaster atrocities and
about the need for draconian military and police intervention.
In altering people’s conception of natural disasters, one
substantial obstacle that public information campaigns will likely
encounter is the phenomenon of “biased assimilation”:
Biased assimilation refers to the fact that people assimilate new
information in a biased fashion; those who have accepted false
rumors do not easily give up their beliefs, especially when they have
a strong emotional commitment to those beliefs; it can be

428–30 (Mar. 2005) (suggesting that anti-smoking campaigns contributed to declines in youth
smoking rates); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Individual
Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1701, 1722 (2008) (finding that
“[r]ecent literature reviews have concluded that more than half of the well-designed and funded
[public information campaigns intended to promote individual behavioral changes that help the
environment] have resulted in significant and positive behavior change”).
82. See supra text accompanying note 31.
83. See Kahan, supra note 27, at 764–65 (suggesting that risk education will be most
effective if it “affirms rather than denigrates recipients’ cultural identities” and transforms the
“social meaning” of the relevant risk).
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exceedingly hard to dislodge what people think, even by presenting
84
them with the facts.

“Biased assimilation” thus encapsulates the common-sense
notion that people tend to process new information in light of their
preexisting beliefs; their precommitments are particularly likely to
influence their assimilation of new information if they have a strong
emotional attachment to, or other investment in, those preexisting
85
beliefs.
News coverage of Japan’s March 2011 earthquake and tsunami
provided an interesting illustration of biased assimilation in the
context of the disaster myth of widespread looting and violence. In
the aftermath of the devastating earthquake and tsunami, news
sources reported—often with surprise—that there was very little
86
looting taking place in Japan. Rather than entertaining the
possibility that the lack of looting in Japan might reflect a broader
truth about human nature that should cause us to reconsider our
deeply held—and mistaken—beliefs about post-disaster human
behavior, newspapers and pundits sought to “explain away” the lack
of looting as the result of some unique characteristic of Japanese
87
society or culture. Indeed, rather than prompting reconsideration of
the Katrina news coverage or discussion of the fact that much of the
early Katrina reporting was overblown and inflammatory, many
media reports on the Japan earthquake simply resuscitated and
repeated the exaggerated claims of looting and violence perpetuated
88
in Katrina’s immediate aftermath. The news reports contrasted the

84. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS: HOW FALSEHOODS SPREAD, WHY WE BELIEVE
THEM, WHAT CAN BE DONE 9 (2009) (emphasis omitted).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Susan Donaldson James & Russell Goldman, Japanese, Waiting in Line for
Hours, Follow Social Order After Quake, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/japanvictims-show-resilience-earthquake-tsunami-sign-sense/story?id=13135355
(“As
Japanese
survivors cope with food and gasoline shortages amidst the aftershocks and rising body count,
they draw on a sense of social order. Unlike scenes in natural disasters in Haiti and New
Orleans, there is little anger, no looting.”).
87. See Sun, supra note 9, at 1144 (citing, e.g., Christopher Beam, Stop, Thief! Thank You.,
SLATE (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.slate.com/id/2288514/ (attributing the lack of looting in
Japan to specific features of the Japanese legal system and Japanese culture); see also Lisa Grow
Sun, Op-Ed., Disasters Bring Out the Best in People, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 26, 2011,
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/51497668-82/looting-disasters-violence-disaster.html.csp.
.
88 See Sun, Disasters Bring Out the Best in People; Pichai Chuensuksawadi, Op-Ed., Stoic
Calm in the Face of Utter Calamity, BANGKOK POST, Mar. 15, 2011,
http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/226703/stoic-calm-in-the-face-of-utter-calamityi
(comparing the calm reaction to the earthquake in Japan to purported “chaos and anarchy” in
response to Katrina in New Orleans).
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calm, orderly behavior of Japanese survivors with the imagined
behavior of Katrina’s survivors.
The difficulties of rooting out firmly entrenched beliefs about
looting and violence after disasters suggest that public education
campaigns might be most effective if they are focused on the youngest
citizens. Many elementary schools provide children with basic
information about disasters (by, for example, conducting earthquake
drills). Education campaigns that teach children that while disasters
are tragedies, they are tragedies that usually bring communities
together, rather than tearing them apart in chaos and crime, might be
effective in creating a less-jaundiced view of post-disaster human
behavior among individuals who have yet to form strong opinions
about the likelihood of looting and other criminal behavior in
disasters’ aftermath. Any such campaigns should, of course, be
subjected to empirical analysis to evaluate their effectiveness over
time.
V. CONCLUSION
Disaster myths—particularly the myth of widespread looting and
violence—interfere with effective disaster response and recovery. The
spread of disaster myths can be usefully analyzed as an availability
cascade. Although there is certainly no panacea for the problem of
disaster mythology, that analysis suggests that the spread of disaster
mythology can perhaps be mitigated by changing the incentives of
availability entrepreneurs who might otherwise perpetuate the myth,
by hiring better-educated emergency managers to advise local
officials in disaster decision-making, and by creating targeted public
information campaigns—particularly campaigns aimed at young
people—that will help alter the social meaning of disasters. While
these approaches are unlikely to completely halt the perpetuation of
disaster mythology, they are important first steps in promoting a
more accurate understanding of typical post-disaster behavior and
designing the most effective policy and legal framework for disaster
response and recovery.

